Hastings Law Journal
Volume 69 | Issue 6

Article 2

8-2018

Gerrymandering and Conceit: The Supreme
Court’s Conflict with Itself
McKay Cunningham

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
McKay Cunningham, Gerrymandering and Conceit: The Supreme Court’s Conflict with Itself, 69 Hastings L.J. 1509 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol69/iss6/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

CUNNINGHAM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

8/19/2018 2:26 PM

Gerrymandering and Conceit: The Supreme
Court’s Conflict with Itself
MCKAY CUNNINGHAM*
The Supreme Court has long held that extreme partisan
gerrymandering violates equal protection, but has simultaneously
dismissed gerrymandering disputes as nonjusticiable political
questions. In particular, the Court has maintained that no manageable
standard yet exists by which the Court could implement the promise of
equal protection to partisan redistricting.
This Article analyzes the manageable standard requirement, revealing
the Court’s failure to consistently apply it. Why is “fairness” a
manageable standard in one context but not another? How are
standards that measure one’s shocked conscious, or weigh the totality
of the circumstances manageable? Importantly, when the Court has
dismissed cases for lack of a manageable standard, it seemingly did so
to preserve confidence in the judiciary.
Recast in this light, the manageable standard requirement serves as
proxy for preserving judicial legitimacy. This Article argues that the
Court should no longer hide behind the manageability barrier because
partisan gerrymandering is an artificial obstacle to democratic
governance. Court intervention to ensure democracy’s proper
functioning was (1) anticipated by the Framers, (2) memorialized in the
Constitution’s form and structure, and (3) exercised by the Court
without loss of judicial legitimacy in analogous contexts. This Article
posits that judicial intervention to unblock the avenues of political
change is one of the Court’s central responsibilities, that in similar
contexts the Court has recognized as much, and that it should do so
again.

* Associate Professor, Concordia University School of Law. Gerrymandering is an intricate
problem, and I am grateful to Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos for his insight. I am also thankful
for the significant editorial contributions provided by Professors Latonia Haney Keith and Ryan Stoa.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters
elected a Republican majority in both state houses, as well as a
Republican governor.1 Seeking to redraw voting districts in the wake of
the 2010 census, Republican leadership hired a law firm and a political
science professor who created a regression model that isolated “the
baseline partisanship of a unit of geography.”2 In conjunction with
redistricting software, the regression model allowed lawmakers to
explore potential districting decisions based on partisan result.3
[Y]ou would open up a plan that you’d been working on or label a new plan
and assign it the Assembly district that you wanted to work with and then
you could also pick a color that you wanted that Assembly district to be. It’s
sort of like a color-by-number exercise . . . .4

In addition to data showing the number of people in a district,
minority group populations, and voting-age populations, the software
also allowed Republican legislators to customize redistricting maps with

1. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 846 (W.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d, Gill v. Whitford, 584 U.S.
__ (2018).
2. Id. at 846–47.
3. Id. at 847–52.
4. Id. at 847–48.
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ease.5 Republican staff and legal counsel created customized
demographic data that generated a composite partisan score reflecting
the political makeup of discrete population units.6 This composite
partisan score enabled aggregation of those units into new districts that
revealed the partisan makeup of the new districts.7
Republican staff members then drafted several statewide maps.8
The drafters considered traditional districting criteria like compactness
and communities of interest.9 The drafters also used the composite
partisan score to assess the level of partisan advantage in each potential
map.10 The drafters met with individual Republican incumbents to verify
addresses and solicit redistricting preferences, asking, “are there areas
you like, are there areas you don’t like, are there areas surrounding your
district that you like[?]”11
Over the course of several months, a variety of statewide alternative
maps emerged, identified by the degree of pro-Republican advantage,
ranging from “[b]asic” to “[a]ssertive” to “[a]ggressive.”12 The drafters
then presented a selection of regional maps to Republican leadership,
along with the partisan scores for each.13 Combining the regional maps
chosen by Republican leadership, the drafters created the “Final Map.”14
In a separate document, labeled “Tale of the Tape,” the drafters
compared the partisan outcome of the proposed final map with the
State’s current map.15 Under the State’s current map, 49 of 99 seats were
50 percent or better for Republicans.16 Under the proposed final map, 59
were 50 percent or better for Republicans.17
Even so, the drafters again scrutinized the proposed final map for
partisan performance, identifying and grouping districts into categories
like “GOP seats strengthened a lot” and “GOP Donors to the Team,” the
latter of which consisted of incumbents with numbers above 55 percent
that donated “points” to weaker Republican districts.18 Once finalized,
5. Id. at 848.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 849–50.
9. Id. at 844, 863 (articulating the defendants’ argument as “Act 43’s districts were congruent,
compact, and fairly equal in population”).
10. Id. at 848–49.
11. Id. at 849 n.36. One senator suggested how to redraw her district to unseat a Democrat: “If
you need a way to take the Staskunas seat, put a little bit of my Senate seat into New Berlin.” Id.
12. Id. at 849–50.
13. Id. at 851.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 852.
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each Republican legislator received data on his or her new district, along
with a memorandum detailing census numbers and a comparison of
election contests in the new district compared to the old.19 The
memorandum excluded data about compactness, continuity, and nonpartisan communities of interest.20
When the drafters presented the finalized map at the Republican
caucus, the drafters stated that “[t]he maps we pass will determine who’s
here 10 years from now . . . .”21 Both houses voted for the redistricting
maps, the Governor signed it, and the redistricting maps were published
as Wisconsin Act 43 on August 23, 2011.22 In 2012, the Republican Party
garnered 48.6 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates but
captured 60.6 percent of the Assembly seats.23 In 2014, the Republican
Party garnered 52 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates
and won 63.6 percent of the Assembly seats.24 In 2016, the Republican
Party garnered 52 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates
and won 64.6 percent of the Assembly seats.25
A three-judge federal court scrutinized these results and struck
Wisconsin Act 43 as an unconstitutional gerrymander under both the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause in November 2016.26
After weeks of litigation, the court in Whitford v. Gill made a series of
factual findings:
[T]he drafters sought to understand the partisan effects of the maps they
were drawing. They designed a measure of partisanship and confirmed the
accuracy of this measure with Professor Gaddie. They used this measure to
evaluate regional and statewide maps that they drew. They labeled their
maps by reference to their partisanship scores, they evaluated partisan
outcomes of the maps, and they compared the partisanship scores and
partisan outcomes of the various maps. When they completed a statewide
map, they submitted it to Professor Gaddie to assess the fortitude of the
partisan design in the wake of various electoral outcomes.27

Notably, the court also cited evidence that the drafters intended to
entrench Republican control for at least a decadeuntil the next
census.28 Even if statewide support for Republicans fell below 48 percent,

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 853.
22. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 708.
23. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853.
24. Id.
25. Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA,
Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2016 (last visited July 29, 2018).
26. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843, 884.
27. Id. at 895.
28. Id.

http://ballotpedia.org/
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the court found that Act 43 assured Republicans a “comfortable
majority.”29
The court’s decision in Whitford marks the first time a federal court
has invalidated a redistricting plan as unconstitutional for partisan
gerrymandering in over 30 years.30 The Supreme Court has long held that
extreme partisan gerrymandering violates equal protection, but it has
simultaneously refused to act and instead labeled such claims nonjusticiable political questions that invite judicial entanglement into a
“political thicket.”31 In particular, the Court has maintained that no
judicially manageable standard yet exists by which the Court could
implement the promise of equal protection to partisan redistricting.32
This Article examines the Court’s use of judicially manageable
standards as a barrier to judicial action in partisan gerrymandering
disputes. A review of the Court’s historical use of the manageable
standard requirement reveals the Court’s unprincipled and discretionary
implementation of it, and that the Court often reduces the manageability
inquiry to a generalized cost-benefit analysis with judicial legitimacy on
one end of the scale. As such, the manageable standard roadblock is
properly seen as a deeper insecurity involving appropriateness of judicial
review. It unearths Professor Bickel’s perennial query regarding the
proper role of the Court:
The search must be for a function . . . which is peculiarly suited to the
capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if
the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable
in a society that generally shares Judge Hand’s satisfaction in a “sense of
common venture”; which will be effective when needed; and whose
discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other departments’
performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own
responsibility.33

This Article does not attempt to answer that question globally, but
argues that in the context of partisan redistricting, judicial intervention
meets this standard. Court intervention to keep legislators from ensuring
re-election comports with the structure of the Constitution, itself
predominantly dedicated to ensuring a representational democracy
29. Id.
30. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (agreeing that partisan gerrymandering
was justiciable, but there was no majority agreement among the six justices regarding the applicable
standard).
31. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 310 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee,
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 841–42 (2015)
(“[G]errymandering remains a viable cause of action even after the decisionalbeit without any real
test for courts to apply.”).
33. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 24 (1962).
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resistant to concentrated power in any one branch. Court intervention in
partisan redistricting is also value neutral. In other words, a
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review avoids
constitutionally enshrining the Court’s personal value judgments and
thereby avoids the criticism that non-elected, life-tenured judges
override the value judgments made by elected representatives.
Intervention to unblock the avenues of political change is one of the
Court’s central responsibilities. In similar contexts, the Court has
recognized as much and it should do so again in partisan gerrymandering
disputes.
Part I surveys the trend toward increased and entrenched partisan
gerrymandering, as well as the resultant injuries visited on
representational democracy. Part II reviews legislative unwillingness to
self-correct and judicial abdication in partisan redistricting disputes
through the political question doctrine. Part III analyzes the Court’s use
of judicially manageable standards, attempting to discern how the Court
determines when a standard is manageable. Part IV argues that the
manageable standard requirement is largely a question of judicial
insecurity. Seen this way, the Court’s refusal to engage in gerrymandering
disputes cuts against recognized constitutional theory and the Court’s
own practice of intervening when the avenues of democratic
representation have been obstructed by those in power. The Article
concludes that the political question doctrine and the manageable
standard requirement should not bar the Court from deciding the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims.
I. NON-REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
“In the 2016 elections for the House of Representatives, the average
electoral margin of victory was 37.1 percent.”34 The winning candidate,
whether Democrat or Republican, typically won by around 70 percent of
the vote to the challenging party’s 30 percent of the vote.35 Of 435
contests, a margin of 5 percent or less arose in only 17.36 Of 435 contests,
33 were decided by a margin of 10 percent or less.37 “In other words, more
than 9 out of 10 House races were landslides where the campaign was a
34. Brian Klass, Gerrymandering Is the Biggest Obstacle to Genuine Democracy in the United
States.
So
Why
Is
No
One
Protesting?,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
10,
2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/02/10/gerrymandering-is-thebiggest-obstacle-to-genuine-democracy-in-the-united-states-so-why-is-no-one-protesting/?.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Nate Silver, So Few Swing Districts, So Little Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2012, at A16 (estimating that of the 435 districts in the House of Representatives, there are only 35
“swing districts”districts “in which the margin in the presidential race was within 5 percentage
points of the national result”).
37. Klass, supra note 34.
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foregone conclusion before ballots were even cast.”38 One commentator
noted that such landslide elections, ensuring that those in power remain
so, might be expected of autocratic nations that are democracies in name
only.39
In the 2016 vote for House of Representatives, Republicans won 49.1
percent of the popular vote and the Democrats won 48 percent.40
Republicans captured 241 seats, or 55.4 percent, to the Democrats 194
seats, or 44.6 percent.41 Four years earlier, in 2012, Democrats garnered
1.4 million more votes than Republicans, but won only 201 seats,
compared with Republicans capturing 234 seats.42 In 2014, Democrats
won 47 percent of the two-party vote but only 43 percent of the seats,43
with the Pew Research Center observing that “there are only 14 truly
competitive House elections this year.”44 National polls show 10 to 15
percent approval of Congress, but only 8 of 393 incumbent House
representatives seeking reelection were defeated by a member of the
opposing party in 2016.45
At the state level, similar results emerged. In Pennsylvania in 2012,
Democrats won 51 percent of the popular state House vote, but only
captured 5 of 18 House seats, or 27.7 percent.46 In the 2014 House
elections in Maryland, 57 percent of the votes in House races went to
Democrats, yet Democrats won 87.5 percent of the House seats.47
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming and several other states have recently posted
similar disparities, prompting one scholar to characterize these districts
as “presumptively unconstitutional.”48 To be sure, gerrymandering is not
38. Klass, supra note 34.
39. Klass, supra note 34 (noting that the 37.1 percent margin of victory is “a figure you’d expect
from North Korea, Russia or Zimbabwenot the United States.”).
40. United
States
House
of
Representatives
Election,
2016,
BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2016 (last visited July
29, 2018).
41. Id.
42. Sam Wang, Opinion, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at SR1.
43. Rebecca Ballhaus, Deep Loss by Democrats Obscures Party’s Numbers Problem, WALL ST. J.:
WASH. WIRE (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/24/loss-bydemocrats-obscures-partys-numbers-problem/.
44. Drew DeSilver, For Most Voters, Congressional Elections Offer Little Drama, PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/03/for-most-voters-congressionalelections-offer-little-drama/.
45. United States House of Representatives Election, supra note 40.
46. United States House of Representatives Elections in Pennsylvania, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Pennsylvania,_20
12 (last visited July 29, 2018).
47. See United States House of Representatives Elections in Maryland, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Maryland,_2014
(last visited July 29, 2018).
48. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 837.
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the sole cause of landslide elections that lack the possibility of
competitiveness, but it is a significant influence.
Professor Stephanopoulos conducted a more direct study examining
the effects of partisan districting on election outcomes.49 The study
included all states with at least eight congressional districts and all state
house plans for all elections from 1972 to 2012.50 Interestingly, the study
revealed a relatively low rate of significant gerrymandering up until the
2012 election, when partisan gerrymandering spiked significantly.51 The
study’s authors conclude that “today’s most egregious plans dwarf those
of their predecessors,” and assert that “the problem of gerrymandering
has never been worse in modern American history.”52
Perhaps most telling, several polls show that Americans do not want
legislators drawing electoral maps. In Virginia, for example, one study
polled over 1,000 Virginians, with 74 percent supporting districting lines
drawn by an independent board rather than state legislators.53 Even
constituents who benefited from gerrymandering rejected it. Of those
identifying as Republicans, only 19 percent said they wanted lawmakers
to define election districts.54 The disapproval of partisan gerrymandering
carried across age and racial groups.55 If the electorate disfavors
gerrymandering, why haven’t elected officials responded by outlawing it?
The question illustrates gerrymandering’s central dilemma: The elected
officials responsible for resisting it are those who most directly benefit
from it.
Partisan gerrymandering benefits the legislators and parties
drawing the district lines, but it carries a host of negative consequences
for the electorate. Academic research into Congressional behavior yields
at least one fixed finding: more than anything else, winning elections
motivates politicians.56 But if opposition is effectively neutralized, the
negative consequences include less responsiveness, less accountability,
less ideological diversity, less compromise, and less institutional

49. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 835–37.
50. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 835–37.
51. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 867 (asserting that up until 2012 “neither party
enjoyed a systematic advantage over its opponent.”).
52. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 838.
53. Citizens Don’t Like Gerrymandering; Study Offers Alternative Redistricting Methods, UVA
TODAY (June 30, 2014), https://news.virginia.edu/content/citizens-don-t-gerrymandering-studyoffers-alternative-redistricting-methods.
54. Benjamin M. Harris & Stephen J. Farnsworth, With Overwhelming Support for Nonpartisan
Redistricting, Virginians Are Studying Ways to Make That Happen, VA. NEWSL. (June, 27, 2014),
https://ceps.coopercenter.org/sites/ceps/files/Virginia_News_Letter_2014_Vol._90_No_4_0.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Silver, supra note 36; Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1997).
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legitimacy.57 A legislator elected with a forty percent margin likely
harbors little incentive to compromise and is constrained, if at all, to
represent only party constituents.58 Indeed, a strong disincentive to
compromise stems from the sole electoral vulnerabilitythe primary.59
If the general election is assured through partisan gerrymandering, the
primary becomes a contest of radicals.60 The most extreme candidate
often secures the party nomination, prompting incumbents to eschew
any semblance of compromise or moderation while in office.61 This, in
turn, incites gridlock and obstruction exemplified, inter alia, in the
shutdown of government,62 pandering filibusters,63 and the downgrading
of the United States’ debt rating.64
Gerrymandering also evokes voter apathy and disillusionment with
the institutions of government. Voters respond and participate in close
elections much more than in elections that appear predetermined.65
Competitive races carry the secondary benefit of participation in other
election matters on the same ballot, reflected most clearly in presidential
election cycles.66 Conversely, predetermined elections curry heightened
incredulity in policymakers and governing institutions.67 The public’s
faith in, and goodwill towards, governing institutions decreases with the
57. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES 39–42 (2002); JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS,
LEGISLATURES, & REDISTRICTING 194–95 (2003).
58. See BUCHMAN, supra note 57, at 194 (noting the self-trenching tendencies gerrymandering
has and that it “weakens incentives for legislators to satisfy constituents . . . .”).
59. Klass, supra note 34 (“In fact, there is a strong disincentive to collaboration, because working
across the aisle almost certainly means the risk of a primary challenge from the far right or far left of
the party.”).
60. THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 41, 49; see also Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Increasing Voter
Turnout
for
2018
and
Beyond,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/increasing-voter-turnout-2018.html (“In primaries
and local elections, turnout can dip into single digits. This has proved catastrophic for both major
parties in our political system, often favoring extreme candidates and ensuring that most incumbents
have no real contest.”).
61. Klass, supra note 34.
62. Jack M. Beerman, The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How
Would We Get One?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (2014).
63. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and
Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 643 (2014) (“At present the
filibuster more often serves as a means to prevent any legislation from passing.”).
64. See Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact
of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 324 (2014) (noting that the
shift to less policy-making and more gridlock in Washington has been “costly to the United States”).
65. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 304–13
(2014); David S. Broder, Voting’s Neglected Scandal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A19.
66. Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at A26.
67. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 456 (2006) (stating that the harm in political
gerrymandering is “an abuse of power that, at its core, evinces a fundamental distrust of voters, serving
the self-interest of the political parties at the expense of the public good”) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 38–50.
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public’s diluted influence over them.68 As such, gerrymandering has been
called “the most insidious practice in American politicsa way . . . for
our elected leaders to entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons
from which they can maintain political power while avoiding democratic
realities.”69
II. LEGISLATIVE UNWILLINGNESS, JUDICIAL ABDICATION
Partisan gerrymandering’s persistent drag on representational
democracy is longstanding, and remediation remains elusive, despite
clear detriments to core democratic functioning. Legislators, of course,
have little incentive to temper self-interest in redistricting. No legal
sanction counterbalances the temptation of ensured reelection and a
manufactured party majority.70 A long history memorializes legislators’
inability to resist temptation.
Even before nationhood, colonists in rural Pennsylvania attempted
to deny the city of Philadelphia additional representatives by refusing
mergers and expansions of jurisdictional boundaries.71 In 1732, the
Governor of the Province of North Carolina tried to:
[D]ivide old Precincts established by Law, & to enact new Ones in Places,
whereby his Arts he has endeavoured to prepossess People in a future
election according to his desire, his Designs herein being . . . to endeavour
by his means to get a Majority of his creatures in the Lower House . . . .72

The First Congress of our new nation suffered allegations of
gerrymandering at the hands of Patrick Henry, who reputedly attempted
to manipulate voting districts to the detriment of James Madison.73
68. See THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 38–50 (explaining the effect of partisan gerrymandering on
the vitality of the political process, namely that it causes “[e]lectoral institutions [to] become
congested” and lose legitimacy).
69. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/.
70. While state legislators are loath to limit their power of redistricting, federal statutes arguably
restrict partisan gerrymandering in some instances. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Place of Chusing [sic] Senators.”); Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491
(providing that Representatives must be elected from single-member districts composed of contiguous
territory); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004) (“The power bestowed on Congress to
regulate elections, and in particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain
dormant.”).
71. See ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 26–28 (Leon Stein
ed., 1974).
72. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 380 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886); see also
GRIFFITH, supra note 71, at 28 (noting that as early as 1732, the governor of North Carolina tried to
gerrymander his state).
73. See 2 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 655 n.1 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co., 1870); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short, Feb. 9, 1789, reprinted in
5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
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It was not until 1812, however, that the eponymous Elbridge Gerry,
the Massachusetts Governor, designed a district so grotesque and
salamander-like as to coin the current locution “gerrymandering.”74 As
noted above, state legislators today continue to draw voting districts
predominantly for partisan gain.75 The current practice demonstrates an
increase, rather than a stagnation or decrease in, the total number of
gerrymandered districts, as well as the degree of gerrymandered
entrenchment.76
With legislators unwilling to forbear, the possibility of reform has
fallen to the judiciary. Court precedent as it now stands invites
uncertainty. For the last thirty-one years, the Court has maintained that
extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause
while simultaneously refusing to show when or how it violates the Equal
Protection Clause.77 Instead, a plurality of the Court insists the judiciary
lacks the ability to show when partisan gerrymandering violates the
Equal Protection Clause.78 The Court’s reticence to articulate a legal
standard interpreting open-ended constitutional guarantees like equal
protection is not new.
That reticence prevented Court intervention into political districting
in Colgrove v. Green in 1946.79 Population shifts generated material
disproportionalities based on outdated districts, handing rural voters a
lopsided share of the vote.80 The Court refused to intervene, maintaining
that it was powerless to do so because the Constitution specifically
entrusted Congress with ensuring a “Republican Form of Government”81
and with ensuring fair elections: “[T]he Constitution . . . conferred upon
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation.”82 This
judicial abstention from redistricting lasted sixteen years.
In 1962, the Warren Court reversed the effect of Colgrove without
technically overruling it when it declared redistricting justiciable under
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Guarantee Clause.83 In
Baker v. Carr, and in a series of subsequent decisions dealing with

74. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
75. See supra Part I.
76. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 867–76.
77. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119 (“Our past decisions also make clear. . . racial gerrymandering
presents a justiciable equal protection claim.”).
78. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–81 (2004).
79. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946) (“It is hostile to a democratic system to
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.”).
80. Id. at 551–55.
81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
82. Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232–37 (1962).
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disproportionate voting districts, the Court cemented its authority to
adjudicate the constitutionality of a wide variety of districting disputes.84
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause demanded “no less than
substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens . . . .”85
and extended its newly articulated standard of “one person, one vote” to
Congressional districts,86 popularly sanctioned malapportionment,87
and local governments.88
The Court’s interjection into redistricting was not limited to
malapportionment, but extended into minority vote dilution under the
Voting Rights Act,89 and then into constitutional racial
gerrymandering.90 In light of the Court’s active role in such redistricting
cases, it was unsurprising when the Court agreed to hear a redistricting
dispute based on partisan gerrymandering.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court again asserted its authority to
decide redistricting cases.91 It maintained that partisan gerrymandering
was justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause and that extreme
instances of partisan gerrymandering violated equal protection.92 A
majority, however, failed to agree on the standard by which alleged
violations should be tested. Justice White’s plurality opinion sketched
out an amorphous test that required discriminatory intent and a
discriminatory impact that “consistently degrade[d] a . . . group of voters’
influence on the political process as a whole.”93 This loose standard
garnered quick criticism from commentators and courts alike,94 resulting

84. Id.
85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
86. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
87. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736–37 (1964) (stating that it was
irrelevant that voters approved malapportionment through an initiative).
88. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 U.S. 50, 56–58 (1970) (applying the
principle to a junior college district); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968) (applying the
principle to county commissioners).
89. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (invalidating districting scheme for
unconstitutionally diluting minority votes).
90. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993) (invalidating districting plan for
improperly relying on race as predominant motive).
91. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 132.
94. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 37–65 (3d ed. 2007) (identifying lower courts’ struggle with making sense of Bandemer and
suggesting Justice White’s standard was ineffectual“Bandemer served almost exclusively as an
invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress. Only one case actually found an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (“The
lower courts have lived with that assurance of a standard (or more precisely, lack of assurance that
there is no standard), coupled with that inability to specify a standard, for the past 18 years.”).
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in lower courts’ near-universal refusal to invalidate redistricting maps
based on partisan gerrymandering.95
Eighteen years later, the Court again took up partisan
gerrymandering. In another deeply divided opinion, the plurality began
by lamenting Bandemer’s precedent: ‘‘Throughout its subsequent
history, Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to
litigation without much prospect of redress.’’96 While the entire Court
affirmed the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of excessive partisan
gerrymandering, a plurality maintained that such claims were nonjusticiable. The claims were not justiciable, according to the plurality,
because there are “no judicially discernible and manageable standards
for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.”97 The plurality
revisited Justice White’s standard from Bandemer and decried the
standard’s obscurity, which it claimed was demonstrated by confusion
among lower courts.
The four dissenting justices in Vieth explained that partisan
gerrymandering disputes were indeed justiciable, but could not agree on
what the standard should be. The dissenters proposed three possible
standards by which courts could determine constitutionality.98 Justice
Scalia, writing for the plurality, dedicated the bulk of the decision to
95. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279–80; White v. Alabama, 867 F. Supp. 1571, 1576 (M.D. Ala. 1994);
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1038 (D. Md. 1994); Fund
for Accurate & Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. Supp. 662, 669 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Ill.
Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v. LaPaille, 782 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Anne Arundel
Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 401 (D. Md. 1991); see
also Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1365 (1987) (discussing why standards are difficult to apply to
gerrymandering).
96. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (quoting S. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 886 (rev. 2d ed.
2002)).
97. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
98. Id. at 317–68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens advocated for a standard targeting
those instances “when partisanship is the legislature’s sole motivationwhen any pretense of
neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan
advantage.” Id. at 318. Likewise, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that a plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of partisan gerrymandering consisting of five elements. First, the
plaintiff must be a member of a “cohesive political group . . . which would normally be a major party.”
Id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). Second, the challenged map must have “paid little or no heed to . . .
traditional districting principles . . . [such as] contiguity, compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features.” Id. at 347–48. Third, there must be “specific
correlations between . . . deviations from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the
population of [the plaintiff’s] group.” Id. at 349. Fourth, an alternative map, complying with traditional
districting principles must be feasible without diluting the voting strength of plaintiff’s political group.
Id. Fifth, claimants must show “the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the
district” to dilute the voting strength of the claimants’ political group. Id. at 350. Finally, Justice Breyer
proposed a continuum: The more entrenched the minority hold on power becomes, “the less evidence
courts will need that the minority engaged in gerrymandering to achieve the desired result.” Id. at 365
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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dismantling these alternative standards and admonishing his colleagues
that “judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule,” before
concluding that “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.”99 Since no
litigant or court ascertained a workable standard in the eighteen years
separating Bandemer from Vieth, the plurality concluded that no such
standard existed and that such claims were therefore and henceforth
nonjusticiable.100
Straddling the gap between plurality and dissent, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the plurality that a manageable standard had not emerged
yet, but disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that a manageable
standard did not exist, stating: “I would not foreclose all possibility of
judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct
an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting
cases.”101 Divided in this way, Vieth presents a precedential purgatory. As
a plurality opinion, it fails to overturn Bandemer’s premise of
justiciability. But until the Court sanctions a judicially discernible and
manageable
standard,
Vieth
effectively
insulates
partisan
gerrymandering from constitutional scrutiny, especially when
considering the unlikely emergence of a “precise” standard.102
In one sense, the Vieth plurality has come full circle to Colgrove v.
Green. The plurality in Vieth and the Court in Colgrove placed
redistricting cases outside the judiciary’s reach by characterizing such
disputes as nonjusticiable. But the Vieth plurality diverges from Colgrove
in one critical aspect: Where the Colgrove Court held redistricting nonjusticiable as a matter of constitutional mandate,103 the Vieth plurality
maintained that redistricting for partisan purposes was nonjusticiable as
a matter of judicial prudence.104 Said differently, the Constitution
provides that Congress has authority to ensure fair elections and a
republican form of government, but it says nothing about the judiciary’s
obligation to fashion judicially manageable standards.105
99. Id. at 278, 281.
100. Id. at 306 (“Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that
Bandemer is incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that case, and decline
to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”).
101. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. See supra note 98.
103. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946).
104. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306.
105. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS
890–91 (5th ed. 2006) (characterizing the first Baker factor as “jurisdictional,” and distinguishing
same from “[f]actors two and three of the Baker test, [which] seem to reflect a different idea [than the
first].”); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258–61 (2002) (indexing the prudential
rationales as distinct from classical political question cases).
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III. GERRYMANDERING AS NONJUSTICIABLE
If it is true, as the Court has held for over three decades, that
excessive partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection
Clause,106 and if legislators refuse to self-correct, the Court’s reluctance
to address the problem due to its self-imposed asylum merits close
scrutiny.107 What is a judicially manageable standard? What test does the
Court employ to determine whether a proposed standard is manageable?
When and how has that test been used in other constitutional contexts?
A. GERRYMANDERING AS A POLITICAL QUESTION
It is worth remembering that the political question doctrine, of
which the requirement for a judicially manageable standard is a subset,
was a twin.108 The birth of judicial review also witnessed the birth of the
political question doctrine, a doctrine that requires judicial abstention in
instances inappropriate for judicial review.109 Even as Chief Justice
Marshall secured enormous judicial power, he simultaneously tempered
its exercise:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.110

From this foundation, the Court later constructed criteria from
which to determine when coordinate branches of government retain sole
authority to interpret and enforce particular constitutional provisions.
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, articulated the most frequently cited
statement of these criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
106. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (reflecting a concession by the plurality that “excessive injection of
politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion assume.”).
107. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976)
(maintaining that the artificial nature of the political question doctrine that excuses the judiciary from
performing its core judicial function “cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny”).
108. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
109. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). Although the Court asserts its inability to
decide issues that are deemed political questions, some commentators maintain that the political
question doctrine does not exist as a justiciability doctrine, but rather serves as a proxy in determining
whether Congress or the executive acted within their powers in political question cases. See Henkin,
supra note 107, at 599; Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The
“Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 427–28 (2014) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has never applied the ‘political question doctrine’ as a true justiciability
doctrine . . . .”).
110. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (ruling that the Court had the authority to review an act of Congress,
and then declaring the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Court original jurisdiction over
writs of mandamus unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution).
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a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 111

The potency of the political question doctrine lies in its finality. Once
labeled a political question, the judiciary may not consider the underlying
merits.112 Discrete constitutional issues remain unanswered due to the
Court’s adherence to the political question doctrine.113 Indeed, in several
instances the Court seemingly identifies a constitutional violation, but
nevertheless permits it, claiming an inability to redress the
transgression.114 The political question doctrine has excused the Court
from considering whether a state’s chartered government was a
“republican form of government” under Art. IV, section 4,115 whether
proposed constitutional amendments expire if unratified for too long,116
and whether an impeachment trial by Senate committee violates the
constitution’s provision allocating that power to “the Senate.”117
Lower courts apply the political question doctrine more frequently
and in contexts not yet considered by the Supreme Court. The
constitutionality of executive action committing troops into potential
combat largely remains unaddressed by the Supreme Court, but lower
courts have relied on the political question doctrine to avoid disputes
stemming from the war in Vietnam118 and U.S. military involvement in

111. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
112. See generally Barkow, supra note 105; Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question
Doctrine and the Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215 (1985); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001); Jesse Choper,
The Political Question Doctrine, Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457 (2005); Amy Endicott, The
Judicial Answer: Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims, 28 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 537 (2010).
113. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (though refusing to address the merits
of the case, conceding that “excessive injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so
does our opinion assume.”). But see Skinner, supra note 109, at 428 (asserting that in nearly all
political question cases, the Court essentially found that “the branch whose conduct was being
challenged acted legallyin other words, within its constitutional or statutory powers.”).
114. As noted above, the Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), refused to correct
malapportioned voting districts by characterizing reapportionment as a “political thicket” that courts
must avoid and by finding that Congress had the sole authority to correct election impropriety under
the Constitution. See supra Part II.
115. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
116. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
117. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–31 (1993).
118. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309–12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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Nicaragua119 and El Salvador.120 More recently, district courts have used
the political question doctrine to avoid merits review of cases involving
environmental harms.121 In one suit against major automobile
manufacturers, claimants sought redress for increased forest fires,
disrupted water supply, and increased flood risk.122 The district court
dismissed the public nuisance suit citing no “manageable method of
discerning the entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged
nuisance.”123 Branding critical issues like foreign environmental harms
and military action as political questions reduces the likelihood of legal
finality, while implicitly sanctioning the status quo.124
B. GERRYMANDERING AS A PRUDENTIAL POLITICAL QUESTION
Not all of the six criteria articulated in Baker share equal footing.
Justice Scalia, in Vieth, maintained that “[t]hese tests are probably listed
in descending order of both importance and certainty.”125 Scholars have
long divided the six criteria into two categories: classical and
prudential.126 Classical political questions are those in which the
Constitution allocates decision-making authority to a coordinate
branch.127 They are rooted in a commitment to separation of powers and

119. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236, 1238–40 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing
to review a private citizen’s challenge to the U.S. Government’s use of private land in Honduras for
military purposes), aff’d on other grounds, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev’d on reh’g, 745 F.2d 1500
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing
to review claims arising out of U.S. government actions in Nicaragua), aff’d, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
120. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
121. See generally Philip Weinberg, “Political Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the
Courts, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2009).
122. See generally California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
123. Id. at *15.
124. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1050
(1985) (“If the judiciary declines to resolve sensitive constitutional disputes, the nation is effectively
left in a constitutional state of nature, in which the constitutional position that prevails is the one that
is the politically or physically most powerful.”).
125. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
126. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 246 (discussing the classical and prudential versions of the
political question doctrine); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 TermForeword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 (1961) (analyzing prudential considerations); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1211–12 (2006) (assessing Baker v. Carr’s impact
on prudential criteria); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1959) (discussing what the political question doctrine should assess).
127. See Gerhardt, supra note 126, at 1211–13 (“Luther v. Borden is famous for recognizing the
classical political question doctrine, which treats as nonjusticiable matters committed by the
Constitution to other authorities’ final decision-making.”).
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limited judicial review.128 When Judge Nixon claimed that his
impeachment trial by Senate Committee violated the Constitution, the
Court declined a merits ruling by relying on Article I: “The Senate shall
have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”129 The Constitution,
according to the Court, allocated decision-making regarding
impeachment processes to Congress alone.130
Prudential political questions, by contrast, “are [not] to be found in
[the] Constitution.”131 They derive from a sense of prudence and
austerity, rather than from rule of law. The requirement of a judicially
manageable standard is a prudential one.132 Although the requirement
for a manageable standard could arguably be characterized as a classical
political question when combined with other criteria,133 the plurality’s
decision in Vieth that partisan gerrymandering is a political question
rested solely on the lack of a manageable standard.134 Notably, the Vieth
plurality did not claim that the Constitution bestowed legislatures with
final decision making authority over the redistricting process. To do so
would have uprooted the Court’s malapportionment and racial
districting precedents.
As a result, the Court’s paralysis on partisan gerrymandering does
not stem from the assignment of decision-making authority over
redistricting to a coordinate branch. Instead, the Court’s paralysis
reflects a deep-seated insecurity regarding the appropriate exercise of the
judicial function. The Vieth plurality said as much, stating that an unclear
court-made standard was not worth “the partisan enmity it brings upon
the courts.”135 The plurality went on to suggest that the legislative branch
is better suited to devise such a standard: “Laws promulgated by the
Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law
128. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 246–49 (describing the “classical” political question doctrine
as developed by Chief Justice Marshall).
129. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6).
130. See id. (“The language and structure of this Clause are revealing. The first sentence is a grant
of authority to the Senate, and the word ‘sole’ indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and
nowhere else.”).
131. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939) (discussing both classical and prudential criteria
in determining the Court should not decide questions regarding expiration of proposed constitutional
amendments).
132. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 265 (“The Court in Baker therefore recognized not only the
classical theory of the political question doctrine . . . but the prudential strand as well . . . .”).
133. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 333 (noting that commentators occasionally disagree about
whether a particular holding is “prudential” or “classical,” especially because political question
holdings often rely on similar underlying justifications); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting
that “the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a
textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”).
134. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004); see also Joshua S. Stillman, Note, The Costs of
“Discernible and Manageable Standards” in Vieth and Beyond, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1292, 1299 (2009).
135. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301.
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pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon
reasoned distinctions.”136 This statement, in a gerrymandering case,
carries some irony. The legislative branch propagates gerrymandering.
The problem is one of its own making. In 241 years, legislators have
shown little willingness to address gerrymandering, and a great appetite
to expand and entrench its influence,137 making the Court’s exhortation
that the legislature is better suited to address gerrymandering issues
inapposite.
Notably, legal theory justifying the political question doctrine
parallels the distinction between classical and prudential.138 Classical
political questions are bound by law; textual commitments of decisionmaking authority to a coordinate branch require judicial abstention.139
As a result, justification for abstention derives from the text and structure
of the Constitution itself.140 The concentration of power in any one
branch or official invites authoritarianism and undermines
representative democracy.141 The Court has historically parroted this
basic tenet of American democracy in its landmark decisions, and the
rationale supporting classical political questions surfaces in the most
prominent political question cases.142
Justifications for prudential political questions are more
practical.143 They are necessarily distinct from the text of the Constitution
and are grounded instead on “theories of normative policy.”144 Judicial
abdication based on prudence is justified by the following:
136. Id. at 278.
137. See supra Part II.
138. See supra note 126.
139. See supra note 126.
140. Wechsler, supra note 126, at 7–8.
141. Although the separation of powers justification for the political doctrine appears unassailable
at first blush, Professors Redish and Henkin, among others, have forwarded strong arguments for the
abolition of the political question doctrine altogether, including classical political questions. Henkin,
supra note 107, at 600; Redish, supra note 124, at 1031–33.
142. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228–31 (1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1849); see also Scott Birkey, Casenote, Gordon v. Texas and the
Prudential Approach to Political Questions, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1265, 1271 (2000) (“The constitutional
rationale behind the political question doctrine emphasizes the separation of powers principle.”).
143. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions,
Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1908–15 (2006) (“The prudential
strand offers a flexible and shifting boundary, to be drawn by the courts in accordance to prevailing
trends in public opinion.”); Skinner, supra note 109, at 427–28. Notably, some doubt remains
regarding the prudential distinction. Justice Sotomayor, for example, listed the last three Baker
criteria as prudential, whereas Professor Scharpf identified a separate category, “functional” political
questions, which includes what others deem prudential. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. J. 517, 566 (1966).
144. Redish, supra note 124, at 1045.
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(1) the inability of the judiciary to develop general principles and rules of
construction of a particular constitutional provision; (2) the judiciary’s lack
of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of one or both of
the political branches; and (3) the judicial humility that flows from the
judiciary’s inherently undemocratic nature . . . . [(4)] the fear that the
judiciary’s authority and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant
disregard of its decision by the political branches.145

Each justification listed above has received significant scholarly
attention.146 It is not the aim of this Article to recount what others already
have done so well. Instead, a precise study of the political question
doctrine as applied to partisan gerrymandering reveals that the Court’s
reticence to decide such disputes is unsupported by the underlying
rationales that animate prudential political questions.
C. GERRYMANDERING AS LACKING A JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE STANDARD
It is worth repeating that the Vieth Court refused review based on
one of six Baker criteria.147 The Court did not hold that the Guarantee
Clause or Article I, section four provided grounds to withhold review. As
such, the underlying justification supporting classical political questions
is inapplicable.148 Instead, the Court solely relied on a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards. Standing alone, the manageable
standard requirement is prudential.149 It is not imposed by law, but by
the Court itself.150 It is more guideline than mandate, and consequently
the Court can choose to disregard it without legal infraction.151 But before
analyzing when the Court chooses to adhere to the manageable standard
requirement, the requirement must first be defined. What is a judicially
manageable standard?

145. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043–44 (synthesizing Professor Bickel’s characterization of the
most prominent rationales for the political question doctrine).
146. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 105, at 244; Henkin, supra note 107, at 600; Redish, supra note
124, at 1034–35.
147. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004); see also Stillman, supra note 134, at 1299 (“What
makes Vieth’s use of the [prudential political question doctrine] unique, at least in the post-Baker
[political question doctrine] era, is that it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable
standards as an independently sufficient rationale for rendering a [political question doctrine]
holding, without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal
branch.”).
148. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2002) (identifying the “only
Baker factor that did not necessarily implicate separation of powers‘a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards’ . . . .”) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 217 (1962)).
149. See Redish, supra note 124, at 1043 (“In my discussion, then, it is necessary to make clear that
by ‘prudential’ I refer to all rationales for effective judicial abdication of review power, other than a
basis in the text of the Constitution.”).
150. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043.
151. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043.
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Defining Manageability

Within the context of gerrymandering, the Vieth Court rejected
Justice White’s proposed standard as well as the three standards
proposed by the dissenters, illustrating examples of proposals that failed
to constitute manageable standards.152 But the Court did not define the
term, nor did it address larger, structural questions. How are manageable
standards defined? What is the test used by the Court to determine
whether a proposed standard is manageable? How has the Court used
that standard in other constitutional contexts, and what rationale
supports it? Professor Fallon addressed many of these questions by
aggregating and analyzing each time the Court meaningfully employed
the manageable standard requirement.153 His review revealed that “the
Supreme Court has never attempted to define what it means by judicially
manageable standards nor to specify what role courts should perform in
developing them.”154
Even so, the Court’s repeated use of the manageable standard
requirement has yielded insights. First, the Court has recognized a
distinction between the Constitution’s provisions and the tests fabricated
by the Court that attempt to enforce them.155 This distinction is most
clearly seen when the Court creates standards from open-ended
constitutional provisions like equal protection and due process.156 Within
the context of gerrymandering, for example, the Court unanimously
agreed that egregious cases violate equal protection.157 But that
constitutional assurance, standing alone, does not necessitate
justiciability: “The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan
gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”158
Second, the Court’s practice of devising standards that enforce
constitutional norms presents no obstacle.159 The Equal Protection
152. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (stating that Bandemer’s majority was unable
to “enunciate the judicially discernible and manageable standard that it thought existed” and
“[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of
principled application”); see also supra note 98 (assessing the various Justices approaches to
establishing workable standards).
153. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1285–1296 (2006).
154. Id. at 1281.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1281–82 (“[T]he need for judicially manageable standards that are distinct from an
underlying constitutional norm arises when the norm itself fails the requirement of judicial
manageability.”).
157. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293.
158. Id. at 292.
159. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1281–84 (“[T]he bare language of the Equal Protection Clause
is not a judicially manageable standard in political gerrymandering disputes. In another usage,
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Clause, itself, is not a judicially manageable standard.160 A judiciallydesigned standard is needed to implement equal protection’s promise.
Almost every Justice in Vieth strove to articulate a workable standard or
demonstrate why a proposed standard was unworkable.161 None attacked
the underlying premise, that the judicial function includes authority to
design workable standards in the first place.162
Third, the standard fabricated by the Court need not precisely reflect
constitutional meaning.163 The Vieth Court pursued a “workable”
formulation, one that hewed to the spirit of equal protection’s promise
without having to replicate it exactly.164 This, of course, implies that the
Court tolerates, even expects, a gap between constitutional guarantees
and the court-made standards devised to implement them. As Professor
Fallon suggests, “[a]lthough close enough is good enough, too much
disparity will not do.”165
While valuable in many ways, these insights fail to unveil how the
Court determines whether a given standard is manageable, or “close
enough.” The Equal Protection Clause says nothing, for example, about a
compelling government interest required before government action
targets certain groups.166 It says nothing about redistricting based on race
as a predominate factor,167 or the necessity for clear guidance in
determining voter intent when counting ballots.168 Yet, in each instance,
the Court used the relatively elastic Equal Protection Clause to fashion
manageable standards that deviate in various degrees from the meaning
of the Clause itself.169 Of course, this practice is not limited to the Equal
Protection Clause. A wide array of decisions contain meaningful gaps

however, judicially manageable standards are not so much inputs as the outputs of constitutional
adjudication. A judicially manageable standard is an output, rather than an input, in any case in which
a court successfully devises a test that can thereafter be used to implement a constitutional provision
that is not itself a judicially manageable standard.”).
160. Fallon, supra note 153, at 1283.
161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–368.
162. See generally id.
163. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1281–84 (“[T]he Justices participating in Vieth all appeared to
assume that a judicially manageable standardif one could be devisedneed not replicate the
Constitution’s meaning precisely.”).
164. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–368.
165. Fallon, supra note 153, at 1284.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1996);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Redish, supra note 124, at 1046 (noting that
“the Court has adopted shifting standards of scrutiny under the equal protection clause that find little
or no basis in the vague terms of that provision.”).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910 (1995).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000).
169. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Miller, 515 U.S. at 903–04;
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.

CUNNINGHAM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

August 2018]

GERRYMANDERING AND CONCEIT

8/19/2018 2:26 PM

1531

between constitutional text and court-made standards. Whether
personal jurisdiction,170 establishment of religion,171 or obscenity,172 the
Court has historically confronted textual ambiguity with judicially
designed standards that either over-enforce or under-enforce
constitutional meaning.173 These many instances demonstrate that no
uniform standard guides the Court when it delineates manageable from
unmanageable.174 According to some scholars, the standard used by the
Court to determine manageability is itself unmanageable: “[T]he Court
makes its judgements about whether proposed standards count as
judicially manageable under criteria that would themselves fail to qualify
as judicially manageable. . . .”175
While it is tempting to conclude that the Court’s illusory process for
determining manageability frustrates efforts to understand that
requirement,176 a partial remedy would be a baseline requirement that
the standard be intelligible and practical. In other words, to be
manageable, the standard must be, at minimum, understandable. As
Justice Scalia puts it, unintelligibility is akin to “judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”177 It then helps
if the standard is practical in the sense that it will likely lead to fairly

170. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112–14 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–73 (1985); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–
12 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
171. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79 (1984); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (Straying further away from the text of the establishment clause, Justice O’Connor
fabricated a new and improved “reasonable person” for purposes of the endorsement test, explaining
that “[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement’ of religion.”).
172. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (adopting a three-pronged test for speech falling
outside the parameters of the First Amendment’s protection of “free speech”).
173. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1298–1306 (“[A] number of doctrinal tests underenforce
constitutional norms (just as other tests produce overenforcement), often for reasons of judicial
manageability . . . .”).
174. Baker v. Carr provides an example relevant to redistricting. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Baker
Court found a manageable standard existed for malapportionment disputes under the Fourteenth
Amendment even though no manageable standard reputedly existed for malapportionment disputes
under the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 209–10. The rationale for discovering a test under one provision
but not the other has little bearing on the court-made standard itself. See Redish, supra note 124, at
1046 (identifying a range of court-made standards before suggesting that “one must suspect the
disingenuousness of the ‘absence-of-standards’ rationale.”).
175. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 153, at 1278.
176. Redish, supra note 124, at 1047 (“Ultimately, any constitutional provision can be supplied
with working standards of interpretation.”).
177. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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consistent results178 as well as results that are actionable.179 Judicial
competence, the ability of the court to fully comprehend the facts of
certain cases as well as the predictability of results stemming from
judicial intervention, are implicit within this consideration.180 Lower
courts, for example, often avoid the merits of cases involving foreign
affairs, citing lack of expertise.181 Similarly, a standard that generates
predictable and consistent results is more likely to be manageable. As
Justice Scalia opined in Vieth, “Some criterion more solid and more
demonstrably met than [fairness] that seems to us necessary to enable
the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion,
[and] to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts . . . .”182
While these baseline factors are helpful, they have not been
consistently followed, and are not themselves determinative.183 The Vieth
Court, for example, rebuked Justice Powell’s purported “fairness”
standard for gerrymandering disputes, even though fairness and justness
play prominent parts in other constitutional standards.184 Indeed,
178. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80
(1989) (stating that “reckonability” is a “needful characteristic”).
179. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1291–92 (discussing courts’ lack of competence to make general
factual or predictive judgments).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274–75 (1946) (“It seems certain, however,
that courts do not possess the techniques or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex
combinations of factors entering into the problems.”) (Black, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973) (avoiding the merits of
dispute involving military action in Cambodia by claiming a nonjusticiable political question because
the dispute raised “precisely the questions of fact involving military and diplomatic expertise not
vested in the judiciary . . . .”); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Judges, deficient
in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield
decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately
determine whether a specific military operation constitutes an ‘escalation’ of the war or is merely a
new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.”); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515,
517–18 (D. Mass. 1968) (avoiding merits review of claims regarding the legality of military tactics in
Vietnam because a “domestic tribunal is incapable of eliciting the facts during a war, and because it is
probably incapable of exercising a disinterested judgment which would command the confidence of
sound judicial opinion”).
182. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004). These practical considerations are balanced
against the fact that a standard, by definition, entails more flexibility than a rule, which is a rigid and
determinate formulation. The more flexible the standard, the more judgement and discretion
required, carrying the concomitant risk of inconsistent results. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1286
(assessing the inconsistency that stems from flexible standards).
183. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1293 (claiming unanswerable questions regarding “how much
analytical bite, or how much predictability or consistency of judicial decisionmaking” is required).
184. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 95–97 (2004) (explaining that “considerations of
fairness” must be considered for equitable remedies); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that “fairness and justice” indicate when a government
taking of property has occurred); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993) (noting that the
federal rules of civil procedure call for separate trials of codefendants when “justice requires”); Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (asserting that personal jurisdiction turns on
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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constitutional jurisprudence teems with standards that lack
administrative facility and ready redress, including balancing tests,185
state-of-mind probes,186 and totality of the circumstances inquiries.187 In
the due process context, constitutionality has turned on whether one’s
conscience has been shocked.188 These examples illustrate that any
constitutional provision, regardless of opacity, can be outfitted with a
court-made standard. As Professor Redish notes, “those standards often
will not clearly flow from either the language or history of the provision,
but that fact does not distinguish them from many judicial standards
invoked every day.”189
2.

Manageability as Proxy for Judicial Legitimacy

Given the many instances in which court-made standards deviate
from constitutional text, and in light of the varying degrees of deviation,
the Court often employs a generalized cost-benefit analysis.190 Is the cost
of reduced judicial legitimacy outweighed by the benefit achieved
through an unwieldy judicial standard? This cost-benefit overlay to
manageability pervades Vieth. The dissenters did not argue that their
proposed standards perfectly fit the constitutional guarantee; the
dissenters argued that their proposed standards were better than the
185. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761, 785 (1985);
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 1052 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926–
28 (1984); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 350 (1984); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516–17
(1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61–68 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987) (providing a thorough review of balancing tests).
186. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (explaining that “the offending conduct
must be wanton”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989) (stating that “[t]he Eighth
Amendment terms ‘cruel’ and ‘punishments’ clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of
mind”); id. at 397 (explaining that Johnson v. Glick’s substantive due process standard puts the
defendant’s subjective motivation in issue); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that
“the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property”); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural
Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 173 (2010) (citing difficulty
pleading factually plausible claims where constitutionality turns on defendant officials’ subjective state
of mind).
187. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 153, at 1288–89, 1288 n.57 (collecting numerous totality of
circumstances cases).
188. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (identifying the “shocks the conscience”
standard). Some standards, although amorphous on their own, acquire greater certainty and
predictability with frequent application. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884–91 (1996).
189. Redish, supra note 124, at 1047.
190. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 300–01 (2004); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
236 (1993); see also Fallon, supra note 153, at 1278 (“In making this ultimate judgment, the Court,
willy-nilly, conducts a startlingly open-ended inquiry in which, among other things, it weighs the costs
and benefits of adjudicating pursuant to particular proposed standards.”).
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status quo.191 Imperfect enforcement outweighs no enforcement at all.
Justice Scalia’s plurality, perhaps surprisingly, also reduced the
manageability analysis to a generalized balancing of the perceived benefit
attending the adoption of an imperfect standard against the perceived
detriment of reduced judicial legitimacy:
Is the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, with the delay and
uncertainty that it brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it
brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achievedan accelerated
(by some unknown degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think
not.192

Perhaps Justice Scalia cribbed this balancing testmanageability
balanced against the Court’s reputationfrom Baker v. Carr in which
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented from court intervention in
malapportionment disputes.193 “Those who consider that continuing
national respect for the Court’s authority depends in large measure upon
its wise exercise of self-restraint and discipline in constitutional
adjudication will view the decision with deep concern.”194 Or, perhaps
Justice Scalia’s balancing test hailed from the Court’s refusal to interpret
impeachment processes, wherein the Court admonished that “opening
the door of judicial review . . . would ‘expose the political life of the
country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.’”195 In fact, Justice Scalia
could have drawn inspiration for the balancing test from a well-spring of
judicial precedent in which the Court declined review to foster
institutional legitimacy.196 As shown above, judicial restraint in the
service of judicial legitimacy is a principal rationale for the political
question doctrine itself. Viewed through this lens, the manageable
standard roadblock reflects a deeper, historical insecurity involving
appropriateness of judicial review.
IV. JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY
Condensing the foregoing analysis is helpful. The Court has
exercised, without serious question, its authority to devise standards that
seek to implement constitutional norms. The Court has accepted a
certain degree of deviation when court-made standards fail to capture
constitutional norms perfectly. Such deviations cannot be “too great,”
191. See supra note 98.
192. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301.
193. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330–40 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 267–330
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 340 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
195. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
196. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
108–15 (1988) (characterizing the political question doctrine in terms of judicial restraint in the
service of judicial legitimacy).
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although no consistent test has emerged by which the Court determines
whether a standard deviates too much, and is therefore unmanageable.
At bottom, the standard must be intelligible. And, though not
determinative, the standard’s practical effects like predictability and ease
of implementation have played a part in manageability decisions. Most
importantly, the Court often enmeshes manageability with judicial
review and related concerns of judicial legitimacy.197
This preoccupation with judicial legitimacy is as old as the Court
itself.198 Assuming that the Court’s concern is valid, and that protecting
its reputation justifies abdication in certain instances, this Article argues
that gerrymandering is not one of them, and that the judiciary validly
intervenes when it acts to ensure representational democracy’s proper
functioning. Correcting artificial obstructions that truncate or unduly
dilute popular sovereignty is value-neutral and well within the judiciary’s
expertise. By contrast, judicial interjection that constitutionally
enshrines one substantive value over another necessarily implicates the
bias of a non-elected Court and has historically proved problematic.
A. CONSTITUTION AS FORM AND PROCESS
The form and structure of the Constitution support judicial review
of disputes that challenge obstructions to representative democracy.
Neophytes, upon first reading the Constitution, are often surprised that
the document, particularly before amendment, resembles a sterile
recitation of compartmental design: which branch and which official has
authority to do which thing. The few substantive rights in the body of the
document are enfolded into larger prescriptions that allocate political
power and ensure constituent participation in government.199
Prohibitions against bills of attainder, titles of nobility, and corruption of
blood do little to burnish the constitution’s reputation as the repository
of individual liberties.200 Said differently, the Constitution primarily
separates powers and outlines processes for effective governance by the
people.201 Even the substantive rights clauses, like Ex Post Facto and Bills
of Attainder, can be viewed as performing separation-of-powers
functions.202 The Constitutionand by extension, judicial

197. See supra Part III.
198. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 253–56 (providing a brief history of the Court’s use of the
prudential factors, in part, to protect the judicial legitimacy).
199. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517–18 (4th ed. 2013) (“The text of the
Constitution, apart from the Bill of Rights, contains few provisions concerning individual liberties.”).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 218 (“[T]he framers thought that an enumeration of rights was unnecessary . . . .”).
202. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 90 (1980).
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reviewprincipally focuses on structure and process in a
representational government of separated powers.203
The amendments, while somewhat more concerned with individual
liberties, are certainly not singularly so. Most of the amendments are
either procedural in function or identify a substantive right that itself
facilitates governmental processes.204 The First Amendment, for
example, guards against government overreach by protecting political
discourse.205 It serves a structural purpose as much as an individualized
one.206 The Fourth Amendment combines an individual privacy right
with procedural protections by suppressing evidence seized from illegal
searches.207 “Amendments five through eight,” as Professor Ely notes,
“tend to become relevant only during lawsuits, and we tend therefore to
think of them as procedural . . . , calculated to enhance the fairness and
efficiency of the litigation process.”208 The amendments added after 1868
largely expand democratic participation through voting, whether based
on race,209 gender,210 wealth,211 location,212 or age.213
By contrast, attempts to embed substantive rights in the
Constitution’s text have a questionable record. The institutionalization of
slavery in the body of the Constitution illustrates a substantive right
remedied only at a horrific price.214 Temperance, also enshrined as a
substantive right, produced upheaval before constitutionally erased
through the Twenty-First amendment.215 Some argue the substantive
right to possess guns fits the same pattern.216 The Constitution is a poor
vehicle for cementing popular value judgments, which tend to evolve

203. Id. at 89. (“The theme that justice and happiness are best assured not by trying to define them
for all time, but rather by attending to the governmental processes by which their dimensions would
be specified over time, carried over into our critical constitutional documents.”).
204. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–XXVII.
205. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L REV. 413, 443 (1996).
206. ELY, supra note 202, at 94.
207. ELY, supra note 202, at 96.
208. ELY, supra note 202, at 95.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
214. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A
Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 413, 418–20 (2006) (arguing that
although slavery was memorialized in the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence
foreshadowed slavery’s “ultimate demise.”).
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 176–
80 (1991) (detailing the failure of prohibition).
216. ELY, supra note 202, at 94–95.
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with society.217 But governmental structure and prescribed processes
designed to ensure participation in representational government
properly embody the Constitution’s highest and best function.
The Constitution’s form and structure demonstrate the Framers’
intent to protect fundamental concepts of freedom and liberty primarily
through democratic processes. Requiring elections of Representatives
every two years, and expressly naming the federal government as
guardian against electoral manipulation, are textual proof of that
commitment.218 Significant debate at the Constitutional Convention in
1787 turned on insulating the essential processes of government from
manipulation so that the House of Representatives, for example, actually
reflected the electorate and were accountable to it.219 The Framers were
responding to the lack of representation afforded them as colonists, in
conjunction with fresh memory of rotten boroughs that corrupted
England’s representative system.220
North Carolina delegate, John Steele, argued that the Constitution
would not permit the creation of rotten boroughs, and that if redistricting
plans that corrupted representation were passed that were “inconsistent
with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them. . . .”221
Delegate Steele was not alone in characterizing the Constitution’s role as
both creating and protecting the representational process. The only time
George Washington addressed the Constitutional Convention on a
substantive issue, he did so in an effort to increase the degree in which
elected representatives reflected their constituents.222 George Mason
claimed that “[r]eps. should sympathize with their constituents; shd.
think as they think, & feel as they feel.”223 John Adams wrote that the

217. See ELY, supra note 202, at 88 (explaining that “the few attempts the various framers have
made to freeze substantive values by designating them for special protection in the document have
been ill-fated, normally resulting in repeal, either officially or by interpretive pretense.”).
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (Gideon ed.,
2001) (“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should
be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people
by a short duration of their appointments . . . . ”)
219. See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We’ve Outgrown? An
Argument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157,
175–76, 175 n.112 (1992) (discussing the history of the Convention).
220. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION
16 (1965) (discussing England’s monarchy and its impact on the United States’ “idea of representative
government”).
221. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]).
222. Yates, supra note 219 at 175–76, 175 n.112.
223. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 134 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
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representative assembly “should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the
people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.”224
Perhaps James Madison was the most ardent defender of protecting
democratic processes through unimpeded representation. In The
Federalist No. 52, Madison wrote that “it is particularly essential that the
[House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on,
and an intimate sympathy with the people.”225 Madison explicitly
referred to state legislatures and the temptation “to mould their
regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.”226
Madison understood that elected officials would attempt to retain power
by obstructing the democratic machinery that allows power to change
hands:
[T]he State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the
common interest at the expense of their local conveniency or prejudices
. . . . [T]he Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled
right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections . . . . It
was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the
discretionary power.227

The Constitution’s concern, and therefore (arguably) the Court’s
concern, turns on procedural protections ensuring unhindered
participation in self-governance. The document’s form and structure
memorialize this central focus of the Framers’ intent.
B. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO FACILITATE REPRESENTATIONAL
DEMOCRACY
The Court has historically exercised judicial review to facilitate
democratic participation and to remove artificial barriers that obstruct
fair processes and insulate elected representatives from public
accountability. The most famous footnote in constitutional jurisprudence
identified instances that merit “more searching judicial inquiry.”228
Footnote four in Carolene Products is deservedly famous for identifying
“discrete and insular minorities” as worthy of heightened judicial
scrutiny in the face of majoritarian discrimination.229
But to so limit the footnote’s interpretation is to overlook a critically
important point. The footnote not only calls for court intervention but
224. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA 403 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 256 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001).
226. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 223, at 241.
227. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 221, at 401.
228. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
229. See, e.g., Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
139, 157 (2012) (citing Carolene Prod. Co.’s footnote four as authority for governmental action dealing
with morality).
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also calls for exacting court scrutiny in order to ensure the proper
working of democratic government.230 Specifically, it requires “more
exacting scrutiny” when “legislation restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation.”231 This language very nearly defines partisan
gerrymandering, a legislative restriction that obstructs the political
process by pre-determining election results.232 Even the footnote’s
protection of discrete and insular minorities is couched in terms of the
court’s role in protecting the democratic process by highlighting
prejudice “which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . .”233
This representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review suggests
the propriety, even obligation, of judicial engagement in partisan
redistricting. The Court has certainly engaged in other contexts aimed at
facilitating representative and participatory functions of democratic
governance. First Amendment free expression jurisprudence, for
example, illustrates court intervention to facilitate democratic processes
just as much as to protect individual rights. The amendment’s language
focuses on limiting government authority: “Congress shall make no law .
. . abridging the freedom speech, of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”234 In the first instance, it ensures political speech, including
open discussion meant to check government overreach.235 Of course,
non-political speech finds protection here, too, but the protection’s
robust scope partly derives from ensuring effective democratic
functioning.236
More germane to gerrymandering, the Court’s involvement in voting
disputes confirms the appropriateness of judicial review to ensure proper
functioning of democratic processes. In the aggregate, the Court’s voting
decisions make clear that the Constitution protects the right to vote in
both federal and state elections: “A consistent line of decisions by this
Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage

230. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
231. Id.
232. See Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining gerrymandering as
“[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts . . . to give one political party an
unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength”).
233. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
234. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
235. See Kagan, supra note 205, at 428–30 (arguing that First Amendment standards of review
are designed to check for improper motive).
236. See ELY, supra note 202, at 93–94 (stating that although First Amendment protection is not
limited to political speech, the concept of free speech is principally “intended to help make our
governmental processes work . . . .”).
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has made this indelibly clear.”237 The Court has intervened to assert
constitutional protection for the right to vote,238 to have votes counted239
and not diluted by ballot box stuffing.240 The Court has intervened to
scrutinize restrictions on the right to vote, including poll taxes,241 literacy
tests,242 property ownership,243 and photographic identification.244 The
Court has interposed its judgement by requiring that states provide
absentee ballots to those who are incarcerated and awaiting trial.245 Even
closer to partisan redistricting, the Court has intervened to invalidate
racial gerrymandering246 and white primaries.247
But the Court’s decisions in malapportionment redistricting
represent the closest analogue to partisan gerrymandering.248 The
question of court intervention in malapportionment cases was not an
easy one. Passionate disagreement over whether it was proper for the
Court to intervene, prompted the Court in Baker v. Carr to request that
the litigants re-argue the case,249 with one Justice so conflicted that he
recused himself due to illness.250 The Court’s ultimate determination that
it properly exercised judicial authority in reviewing malapportionment
claims and that Tennessee’s malapportionment impermissibly diluted
voting under the Equal Protection Clause had a wide and continuing
impact.251 Tennessee was not the only state forced to re-draw district
lines; the controversial ruling affected nearly every state in the union.252

237. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
238. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665, 666–67 (1884).
239. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 387 (1915).
240. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 387 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1879).
241. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966).
242. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1959).
243. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 367 (1981); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969).
244. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008).
245. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).
246. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
247. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 45–68 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–61 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927).
248. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 468 n.9 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court’s approach to one person-one vote claims could serve as
a template for a gerrymandering test).
249. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 186 (1962).
250. Id. at 237; see also Carlo A. Pedrioli, Instrumentalist and Holmesian Voices in the Rhetoric
of Reapportionment: The Opinions of Justices Brennan and Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 4 ALA. C.R.
& C.L. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2013) (detailing the Court’s internal debates leading up to the Court’s formal
decision).
251. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern
Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002) (discussing state
experimentation with the standard established in Baker).
252. See generally id.
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Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized this case as the most
significant of his tenure.253 The Court partially explained the importance
of its ruling in a later opinion: “The right to vote freely for the candidate
of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.”254 In a series of cases following Baker v. Carr, the Court
repeatedly emphasized the propriety of Court intervention to ensure
proper democratic functioning. The Court stressed, for example, that
“the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society,” and that “any infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”255
In another malapportionment case, the Court again couched its
justification for intervention in terms of democratic government. “To say
that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would . . . run
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government . . .”.256
When admonished that state governments are better suited than the
Court to address irregularities in voting district population, that judicial
intervention diminishes legislative prerogative, and that a “political
thicket” and a “mathematical quagmire” would surely attend judicial
intervention, the Court gave a succinct response. “Our answer is this: a
denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection;
our oath and our office require no less of us.”257
The logic and rationale bolstering judicial review in
malapportionment disputes applies with equal force to partisan
gerrymandering. Indeed, Court intervention in gerrymandering disputes
is arguably more appropriate. Legislators intentionally dilute voting
equality in gerrymandering disputes, whereas malapportionment arises
innocently as people migrate from rural to urban districts. In both, the
avenues normally available to effect change in democratic governance are
constricted.
As noted above, the Court has not acted to clear these avenues but
has abstained for three decades, citing a lack of a judicially manageable
standard. The precedential purgatory imposed by Vieth remains the law
of the land. Because Justice Kennedy, as the fifth vote, rejected the
dissent’s three proposed standards as unworkable, but maintained the

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
Id. at 562.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
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possibility that a workable standard would someday emerge, enormous
efforts to contrive a suitable standard followed.258
C. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO FACILITATE REPRESENTATIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN WHITFORD V. GILL
The claimants in Whitford proposed a new manageable standard
dubbed the “efficiency gap,” which measures the difference between the
parties’ wasted votes.259 Votes cast for a losing candidate are deemed
“wasted” as are votes in excess of what the winning candidate needed to
prevail.260 Gerrymandering generates substantial “inefficiencies” by
packing favorable votes into a single district, and by cracking other
districts results in large numbers of losing votes.261 The efficiency gap
combines the wasted votes from all districts, reducing the inefficiencies
to a single percentage.262 Importantly, this measurement also reveals
entrenchment. States that have efficiency gaps of at least seven percent
will yield substantially similar election results year over year, despite
plausible shifts in voter preference.263 The efficiency gap, as a result,
identifies gerrymanders “that are both severe and entrenched.”264
The trial court in Whitford did not solely rely on the efficiency gap
as the definitive standard, but used the measurement when applying a
three-pronged test.265 The court’s test analyzed whether redistricting:
“(1) [was] intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of
the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation,
(2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate
legislative grounds.”266 The efficiency gap informed the second prong of
the test by showing that Wisconsin’s map would have ensured
Republican advantage through the lifetime of the map.267 The ability to
measure such entrenchment allowed the court to distinguish inherent
from invidious discrimination, a distinction critical to Equal Protection
analysis.268

258. See Stillman, supra note 134, at 1318–21 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is
an invitation to propose new standards that “cannot help but invite more litigation”).
259. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 860–61. But see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98 (defending an 8
percent gap as demarcating maps that are presumptively invalid).
264. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 836.
265. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 898–910.
268. Id. at 909–10, 913–27.
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The Supreme Court accepted review but ultimately remanded for
lack of standing. If the Court abstains in future cases, partisan
gerrymandering will likely intensify. Arguments favoring abstention
characterize the efficiency gap as unmanageable.269 The standard, it is
argued, cannot perfectly account for shifting voter preferences, which
potentially dilutes entrenchment.270 If shifting voter preferences diffuse
the gerrymander’s effect, the redistricting occasions no harm. Another
criticism of the efficiency gap derives from Justice Kennedy’s concern of
determining “how much partisan dominance is too much.”271 The
efficiency gap attempts to address that concern by identifying the level of
inefficiency that yields entrenchment.272 But this standard is itself
imprecise. The trial court found a seven percent gap presumptively
violative; the authors of the efficiency gap model posit that an eight
percent gap is presumptively violative.273
As noted above, however, the standard need not perfectly
implement the constitution’s meaning. Constitutional jurisprudence
overflows with imprecise standards.274 Again, malapportionment serves
as the closest analogue. The malapportionment standard, one person,
one vote, was lauded for its ease of administration, its manageability.275
But a closer study reveals instances where strict adherence to the
standard was impracticable.276 As a result, the Court recalibrated the
standard, holding redistricting presumptively unlawful when population
deviations exceed ten percent.277 Presumptive invalidity of ten percent in
malapportionment cases is not dissimilar from presumptive invalidity of
seven percent in gerrymandering cases. The efficiency gap does not
perfectly reflect equal protection’s promise, but it isn’t required to do so.
CONCLUSION
Whitford v. Gill presented a missed opportunity to look more closely
at the Court’s past refusal to decide gerrymandering disputes. The
political question doctrine and, more particularly, the prudential
269. See Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly at 3, Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 1506064, at *3.
270. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 895–96.
271. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98.
272. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 836–37.
273. Compare Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 860–61 (2016), with Stephanopoulos &
McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98.
274. See supra Part III.
275. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (2000)
(describing one person, one vote as having the “virtue of being easy to administer”).
276. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
277. See id. (“Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with
a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”) (citations
omitted).
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requirement that the Court abstain if it lacks a judicially manageable
standard, has heretofore stopped the Court from identifying those
gerrymanders that violate equal protection. But an analysis of the
manageable standard requirement reveals the Court’s failure to define
what a manageable standard is. More disconcerting, the Court has
applied the manageable standard requirement haphazardly, illustrated
by scores of court-made standards that either over- or under-enforce the
constitutional norm they purport to implement. Why is “fairness” a
manageable standard in some contexts but not others? How are
standards that measure one’s shocked conscious, or weigh the totality of
the circumstances judicially manageable?
While a review of the Court’s application of the manageability
requirement yields few insights, one common thread connects the
Court’s use of the manageability requirement to its insecurity in
exercising judicial review, indicating that the Court often applies the
manageability requirement when particularly insecure in exercising the
judicial function. Recast in this light, the question of Court engagement
in gerrymandering disputes turns on the propriety of Court intervention
to address artificial obstacles that disrupt democratic functionality, a
question squarely within the judicial role. The Constitution as a whole, in
structure and form, demonstrates the document’s principal aim of
ensuring representational democracy through prescribed processes. The
relatively few provisions in the Constitution that memorialize
substantive rights are sporadic and enfolded into the broader
constitutional design that details democratic processes.
The Court’s jurisprudence also favors intervention. In analogous
contexts, the Court has identified manageable standards in disputes
involving artificial obstacles to proper democratic functioning. Whether
impediments to voting, malapportionment, or racial gerrymandering,
the Court consistently and appropriately intervenes to protect popular
sovereignty and to ensure that those in power cannot insulate themselves
by fabricating barriers to democratic processes.
Court intervention is warranted. The Framers contemplated the
Court’s role to include correcting artificial strictures on representational
democracy, the Court has historically and successfully done so, and
adequate judicial tools exist to measure and censure harmful partisan
gerrymandering. One of the Court’s central responsibilities is to protect
democratic governance. The Court has recognized as much historically.
It should do so again and directly address the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering.

